8-15-2020 | Liz Axtell book review of "The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: by Rashid Khalidi

 

The Hundred Years' War on Palestine--A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917-2017 by Rashid Khalidi 

Review by Elizabeth Axtell 

As I think Rashid Khalidi makes clear in this book, the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a history of colonialism in the creation of present day Israel.  He describes his personal experiences related to the conflict, but also the involvement of members of his family in the history.  While in Jerusalem, Professor Khalidi had access to the private libraries of some of the oldest families in the city, including the Khalidi family. 

Yusuf Diya-al-Din Pasha al-Khalidi was Professor Khalidi's great-great-great uncle.  He was a well educated man, who among the various positions he occupied, was mayor of Jerusalem for ten years.  Yusuf Diya was aware of European anti-semitism and also familiar with Theodor Herzl and the Zionist movement.  In March of 1899 Yusuf Diya sent a seven page letter he intended to be passed on to Herzl;  in it he said he understood the motivations for Zionism, but he warned of the consequences of creating a sovereign Jewish state in Palestine. 

Herzl replied shortly thereafter, in which like so many Europeans of that time, he considered the existence of the indigenous population as insignificant.  As Professor Khalidi points out, this condescending attitude toward the Arab population of Palestine was continued by Zionist, British, European and American leaders down to the present day. 

In the book, Rashid Khalidi focuses on major turning points in the struggle over Palestine.  World War I and the Balfour Declaration passed by Great Britain in 1917 were important turning points.  Hundreds of years under government control of the Ottoman empire was ended, and the Balfour Declaration called for a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.  In addition to these shocking developments, Palestine came under British rule and the "destructive force of the Mandate."  These changes encouraged the Palestinians to organize politically. 

Palestinians engaged in a general strike and armed revolt in 1936-37, which Great Britain took two years to put down, and did so through a "bloody war against the country's majority."  Britain's harsh suppression of Palestinian resistance greatly benefitted the Zionist movement;  during the uprising many Palestinians were killed, wounded, jailed and exiled.  Palestinians were left in a weakened position.  After World War II, Great Britain became a "second-class power."  Professor Khalidi's uncle, Dr. Husayn al-Khalidi, said that by then, "Britain had already more than done its duty to its Zionist protege." 

Another turning point, of course, was the November 29, 1947 vote by the United Nation's General Assembly on Resolution 181 which favored the partition of Palestine.  Then came the Nakba in 1948 and the creation of the State of Israel.  Israel now controlled 78 percent of the territory of what had been Mandatory Palestine, and over 720,000 Palestinians became refugees.   One major problem during this period were differences among the Palestinians themselves who "remained fragmented politically."  Great Britain was now eclipsed in the Middle East by the United States and the Soviet Union, who for different reasons, supported the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state.

 A further turning point in this history was the 1967 Six Day War.  Israel, because of its superior military forces, defeated Arab forces, and conquered the Sinai Peninsula , Gaza Strip, West Bank, Arab East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.   Actions in the U.N. Security Council dealing with the cease fire demonstrated the role of the United States regarding Israel.  The United States crafted U.N. resolution SC 242 in the aftermath of the war.

 According to Khalidi, the Six Day War and SC 242 actually became the spark in reviving the Palestinian national movement, and that by defeating the Arabs, Israel resurrected the Palestinians.  There was a revival of Palestinian identity and new political movements and armed groups arose.  One of the groups that gained popularity was Fatah which was founded in Kuwait and headed by Yassar Arafat.  Its only focus was the Palestinian cause.  Later, it took control of the Arab League created Palestine Liberation Organization and Arafat became its chairman.  Palestinians were now better able to make their case, and Israel reacted to their growing influence.

 Professor Khalidi points out that the effectiveness of the PLO was limited by its failure to give more attention to diplomacy as well as understanding the United States and American public opinion.  This was a continuing problem with the PLO and Yasser Arafat.  Under the Carter administration in 1979, the Camp David agreement resulted in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.  The Palestinians were not included in the negotiations and conditions became worse for them.  Israel could now  "set about reinforcing its colonization of the Occupied Territories."

 (This is Part One of the book review)

 Elizabeth

 Review by Elizabeth Axtell--Part II

 At the time when Israel began its invasion of Lebanon in June of 1982, Rashid Khalidi and his family were living in Beirut.  He had been teaching at the American University for six years.  This invasion was directed against the PLO, and Ariel Sharon was Israel's defense minister;  he not only wanted to destroy the PLO militarily, but also end Palestinian nationalism in the Occupied Territories.  Khalidi describes the death and destruction that took place during the invasion and the support that Israel received from the United States during this time. 

When the PLO finally agreed to withdraw from Beirut, it did so "in exchange for ironclad guarantees for the protection of the civilians who would be left behind."  Thousands of the PLO's militants and fighting forces left.  But, the American, French and Italian forces supervising the evacuation withdrew "as soon as the last ship left," and the civilian population was left unprotected.  More than thirteen hundred civilians were massacred in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by LF Phalangist militias who were allies of Israel.

 Fearing for their safety, Khalidi's family left Lebanon and ended up in Cairo where they had family.  Although they eventually returned to Beirut for a while, they finally left for good.  In going over this episode in Lebanon, Khalidi states that the United States stepped into a position formerly played by Britain in the 1930's, repressing the Palestinians in service to Zionist ends.  He also observes that the political impact of the 1982 war was enormous, bringing about many changes in the Middle East to this day.

 One result was the rise of Hizballah in Lebanon.  Another change was increased sympathy for the Palestinians.  And, rather than ending Palestinian resistance, it increased.  According to Khalidi, the 1982 war actually strengthened "the Palestinian national movement in Palestine itself..."  In 1987 the First Intifada erupted in the Occupied Territories.

 From the beginning of the First Intifada until 1996, Israeli troops and armed settlers killed 1,422 Palestinians--over 20% age 16 and under.  One hundred and seventy-five Israelis were killed by the Palestinians;  86 of those were security personnel.  Khalidi states that the intifada was "a spontaneous, bottom-up campaign of resistance...initially with no connection to the formal political Palestinian leadership."

 A new generation of Palestinians had come of age who were more fearless than their elders.  Meanwhile, the PLO and Arafat were stuck in Tunis and were "surprised" by the outbreak of the grassroots uprising.  Although they were glad about this development, Khalidi points out that the PLO leaders in Tunis did not really understand what the situation was like inside the Occupied Territories under Israeli control, and were trying to run things remotely from Tunis--ignoring local views.  Moreover, that Arafat and the PLO had a poor understanding of what the United States was like--unlike the Israelis.  In addition, they did not grasp the lack of American concern for the aims and interests of the Palestinians, nor how closely linked were the policies of the United States and Israel.

 Unfortunately then, the PLO under Arafat failed to take full advantage of the intifada.  As events and negotiations led up to the Oslo Accord in 1993, tensions developed between Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and the PLO in Tunis, which Israel took advantage of.  Outside of the formal negotiations, Israel and the PLO met secretly and came to an understanding whereby many PLO people would be "allowed to enter the Occupied Territories and take up duties there as security forces."  Thus, most of the PLO's leaders and cadres were allowed to return to Palestine.

 Under the agreement signed on the White House lawn in September 1993, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians, and the PLO recognized the state of Israel.  But, Khalidi states that the agreement was "neither symmetrical nor reciprocal."  And that, "a national liberation movement had obtained nominal recognition from its oppressors without achieving liberation."  Khalidi visited Arafat in 1994 after his return to Palestine.  Khalid had been living in Jerusalem and wanted to express his concerns about the worsening Palestinian situation in that city.  But, to no avail--Arafat was not worried.  The visit was a waste of time.

 Additions to the Oslo agreement set up areas A,B, and C.  Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories continued, and life for the Palestinians became more and more restricted, especially after the Second Intifada.  "...the PLO had entered the lion's mouth, and it did not take long for the jaws to snap shut."  Eventually the Israeli army imposed a siege on Arafat's Ramallah headquarters and he became a virtual prisoner until his death.  Looking at the situation after Oslo, Professor Khalidi makes several points.  The colonial reality is unequal and unchanged.  The Palestinian Authority has no sovereignty and can do only what Israel allows it to do.  The PLO was enlisted by Israel as a subcontractor for the occupation.  The United States has been Israel's partner in this.  The "Palestinian leaders allowed themselves to be drawn into complicity with their adversaries."

 As Palestinians became more and more disappointed with the Oslo Accords and the PLO, the popularity of Hamas increased.  The Second Intifada erupted in September 2000, and there was a huge increase in violence, which included Israel's use of heavy weapons, and suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. Khalidi concludes that the Palestinians were the biggest losers during these events, and that a positive image of them was erased.

 After Arafat's death in 2004, Mahmoud Abbas took over as head of the PLO and Fatah; his leadership has been ineffectual.  Israeli abuses against Palestinians and attacks against Gaza showed that the Palestinian Authority had no sovereignty and could do only what Israel allowed it to do.  When Hamas decided to run in the 2006 election, it won by a wide margin--getting 74 seats to Fatah's 45 seats in the 132 member assembly.  Attempts by Hamas and Fatah to form a coalition government were strongly opposed by Israel and the United States.  When Fatah security forces tried to unseat Hamas by force, the latter defeated those forces and took control of Gaza.  Israel then imposed its siege of Gaza.

 According to Professor Khalidi, Israel's savage attacks against the people of Gaza has resulted in increased sympathy for the Palestinians among Americans, especially younger Americans.  American public opinion has been shifting on the Palestinian/Israeli issue, but among the political leadership in Washington there  has been little change in policy regarding Israel.  He states that Palestinians cannot afford to remain divided.  "It is a searing indictment of both Fatah and Hamas that in recent decades civil society initiatives such as Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions movement and student activism have done more to further the Palestinian cause than anything either of these two main factions has undertaken."

 I think this is a very good book.  It provides a clear understanding of the course of events in Palestine during the one hundred years between 1917 and 2017.